Clock validity and operation ordering#
HRC uses the released HyperNet host monitor's signed clock export. Configuration pins its public key and the absolute canonical observation path. Verification binds the signature, exact versioned bytes and the current kernel boot, and requires unshifted monotonic and boot-time namespaces. The verifier cannot change the clock, choose a new monitor or renew an expired observation.
The supported export is the published TrustWire envelope containing kind44, version1, kernel boot, sample UTC milliseconds, sample boot milliseconds, original expiry, maximum error and canonical source address. It has one pinned Ed25519 signature. Inputs are at most4096bytes. The original lifetime is exactly1000ms; error plus observed wall-clock drift must remain at most250ms. The implementation matches the released export and clock contracts. This is verification of a local clock observation, not a second HyperNet authority evaluator.
At an operation boundary, HRC uses the conservative interval UTC minus250ms through UTC plus250ms. A not-before condition requires the lower bound to have reached it; expiry requires the upper bound to remain strictly below it. The original signed observation is rechecked at the serial authorization point. Reading, copying, forwarding or queueing never restarts its lifetime. Missing, expired, future, wrong-boot, altered or shifted-clock evidence makes clock-dependent operations unavailable. Generic transport failure does not establish clock health.
Every authoritative database transaction retains a nondecreasing lower UTC floor inside its guarded state. Startup and subsequent effects require a current valid observation whose lower bound has reached that floor. A clock rollback therefore cannot reopen old retry windows or resurrect grants from a restored database. The external continuity guard separately prevents an old snapshot from silently becoming the current service state. A reboot requires a new current-boot clock observation and fresh transport/session proof. Old pending session challenges die; committed outcomes and still-valid durable retry windows remain resolvable.
Acquire an action-bound HyperNet authority observation outside the service writer lock. Inside the serial order, recheck its usability, the clock and current endpoint, account, delegation, membership, moderation and agreement state. Commit the resulting state, event and operation outcome together. Persist the continuity guard before publishing an acknowledgment. A storage failure after authorization can leave the outcome unknown; it cannot justify a new operation identifier or turn a committed event into a rejection.
Federated peers never compare boot-clock numbers from different hosts. The home issues a one-use challenge with an original boot deadline at most5000ms away. The origin signs its conservative expiry in UTC, clipped by its current authority and credential limits. The home requires its current UTC upper bound below that source expiry and its own original challenge deadline still live. Forwarding cannot reset either bound. The accepted origin attestor remains the authority for source-side statements; destination HRC policy and withdrawal barriers remain home-owned. No timestamp establishes instantaneous global revocation.